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Intro1 
The main question that I address in this article is how to conceptualise the 
complex im/possibilities of refusing and choosing in relation to gender? I am 
particularly interested in a phenomenon that can be described as ‘lesbian 
haunting’ (as foregrounded in this special issue): the ambivalences one will find 
in tracing lesbian theory in relation to transing gender. Following Avery Gordon’s 
(2008) theoretisations of haunting, I am attempting to make sense of the ghostly 
presences in knowledge productions on transing gender. More specifically, in 
order to understand both ‘gender’ and ‘transing gender’2 as always already 
racialised, my approach relies on theories that identify ‘ungendering’ as an effect 
of racial violence (e.g. Spillers 1987, Lewis 2017, Snorton 2017). With this, it is 
my attempt to rethink lesbian, queer and trans feminist approaches on violence, 
and investigate the role of sexual violence within broader concepts of violence. 
Building on knowledge productions that point out the impact of racism and 
colonialism  for  constructions  of  gender  as  a  binary  and     heteronormative 
 
 
 
1 Many thanks to Ilana Eloit and Nydia A. Swaby for their generous engagement with this article and for brilliant 
comments and discussions. Thank you to the anonymous reviewers and to the audience at the conference Trans 
in Transit in Turku, Finland, where I presented this paper in November 2018, for the invaluable questions and 
insights. 
2 ‘Transing gender’ in the conceptualisation I am relying on here means going beyond gender as a pre-given 
category, questioning binary gendering, deconstructing gender as a knowable and certain entity (e.g. Noble 2012; 
Stryker et al. 2008; Tudor 2017b). 
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concept, this paper is an invitation to think through what a refusal to do what I 
call ‘the labour of misogyny' might mean. 
 
Lesbian theory has a complicated relationship with feminist, queer and trans 
studies – as indeed these strands of knowledge production have also with each 
other (e.g. Enke 2012; Halberstam 2011; Hemmings 2011; Wiegman 2012). This 
article relies on the idea that one can tell the story of these fields in ways that 
assume shared and divided/dividing histories. Therefore, I am concerned with 
analysing the ways in which lesbian, queer and feminist approaches can be seen 
as a synergy that works towards the transing of gender. Looking at the 
contradictions in lesbian feminist theorising and addressing in particular 
contradictory approaches to sexual violence, my analysis stresses the 
ambivalence that lies in the term ‘haunting’: haunting as the driving force that 
leads to relentless efforts to fight against oppression; haunting as the nightmare 
that keeps coming back to us; haunting as the reminder of a smouldering guilt; 
haunting as the impulse for radical transformation. 
 
 
Lesbian Hauntings: The Lesbian/Feminist Work of Transing Gender 
 
Lesbian Transphobia  
 
Recent incidents like the transphobic intervention in the name of lesbians at the 
2018 London Pride suggest that lesbian/dyke and trans positions are politically 
oppositional, mutually exclusive and antagonistic. However, many of ‘us’ queer 
feminists, lesbian feminists and trans feminists know from our own struggles, 
positionalities and politics that lesbian/dyke/femme/butch/ trans/non-binary 
can be seen as overlapping, interconnected and in complex interaction with one 
another. 
Dr Alyosxa Tudor | at53@soas.ac.uk 
3 
 
 
 
 
With an explicit focus on sexual violence, the transphobic leaflets distributed by 
the lesbian group Get the L Out3 at London Pride claim to oppose ‘rape culture’ 
and see lesbians erased through the existence of trans people. The UK based 
group Mayday4Women that endorsed the pamphlet states on its website that 
‘transgenderism is currently one of the biggest threats to feminism in the UK’.4 
Trans men and gender-nonbinary positions, so the argument goes, take away 
the possibility for ‘women’ (and for girls, in the variation that claims to protect 
children) to identify as women despite of being tomboy/lesbian/butch/non- 
traditionally feminine etc. representing. Moreover, trans women in this idea 
commit sexual violence by merely existing, both through their presence in 
women’s spaces and through their claim to their own bodies as women’s bodies. 
This reference to sexual violence as a strategy of feminist/lesbian transphobia is 
not new.5 We can think of Janice Raymond’s vicious attack on trans people and 
specifically on Sandy Stone, in which she states that transwomen ‘rape women's 
bodies by reducing the real female form to an artifact [sic]’ (Raymond 1994 
[1979], 104). In a similar vein, Sheila Jeffreys, in her 2014 book titled Gender 
Hurts, constructs transwomen as ‘eternal men’. Men in this equation are the 
eternal perpetrators and women are eternal victims of sexual oppression, 
neither of them able to leave this fate that lies in the body they were born with. 
Needless to say, Jeffreys’ approach is full of inaccuracies and inconsistencies (see 
Awkward-Rich 2017; Stryker/Bettcher 2016). She accuses trans people (and 
trans and queer feminist scholars) of gender essentialism, but she herself defines 
sex  as  a  biological,  eternal  and  universal  category  (Jeffreys  2014,  6).    Her 
 
3  https://getthelout.wordpress.com/2018/07/05/the-journey-begins/ [15/12/2018] 
4 https://www.mayday4women.com/about/ [15/12/2018] 
5 While I am concerned here with lesbian/feminist equations of trans existence with sexual violence, Alex Sharpe 
(2018) examines cases in the UK in which gender-nonconforming subjects/trans men are prosecuted for sexual 
assault because of not disclosing their gender history to their sexual partners. It becomes clear that the current 
wave of feminist transphobia in the UK is embedded in this legal discourse that sees the failure to tell the ‘truth’ 
about gender always already as sexual violence. This resonates with Sandy Stone’s critical analysis in her 
landmark essay ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ (1987) in which she notes that transphobia is ‘about morality tales and 
origin myths about telling the “truth” of gender’. 
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understanding of social constructionism seems to exclude ‘sex’ and ‘women’ 
from being socially constructed, as she thinks that ‘it is through their biology that 
[women’s] subordination is enforced and maintained through rape, 
impregnation and forced childbearing’ (Jeffreys 2014, 6). Jeffreys’ central 
argument – trans people are clinging to essentialist stereotypical notions of 
gender which she sees as opposed to feminist theories of ‘social 
constructionism’ – is indeed what I would call a hostile takeover of some of 
feminism’s key theories. Jeffreys (2014, 49) uses lesbian feminist theories like 
Wittig’s – very much in contrast to my own reading of them in the next 
subsection or indeed to other radical lesbian readings (see Eloit 2018, 26) – to 
bash theories of ‘gender’ in favour of the inescapability of ‘sex’. The key point 
for my argument here is that this emphasis reinforces understandings of 
women’s oppression as both linked to sexual violence and as written into the 
body. In Jeffreys’ account, Gender Studies, queer theory and poststructuralist 
approaches have introduced ‘gender’ as a category to hurt women (Jeffreys 
2014, 3, 36, 41) and to distract from the fact that sex cannot – under no 
circumstances – ever – be changed or be understood to signify something else 
than penis=perpetrator and vagina=victim. 
 
Many of these arguments have been used in a similar way in feminist anti- 
pornography and anti-sex-work approaches. As Wendy Brown points out in her 
critique of Catharine MacKinnon, understanding the category ‘woman’ entirely 
as a product of the ‘eroticization of dominance and submission’ (1995, 81), and 
defining the relationship of sexuality to gender only as parallel to the relationship 
of  labour to  class6,  does not allow  for an intersectional approach  to   gender. 
 
6 This means that gender is understood as a binary concept in which the dominant ‘class’ (men) owns ‘the means’ 
of sexuality while the oppressed ‘class’ (women) is forced to ‘sell’ – submit – their sexuality to men (in analogy 
to the Marxist distinction of capitalists who own the means of production and the working class who must sell 
their labour). 
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Gender remains a monolithic concept unaffected by racism, ableism, classism 
etc. as it is only explicable in drawing analogies to class and labour but not seeing 
gender as already constituted through class, labour, racialisation, or geopolitical 
context. 
 
The idea that transwomen are ‘men in disguise’ that is so often evoked in some 
strands of feminism, very often lesbian feminism, of course reverses or obscures 
the fact that transwomen like most trans, queer, gender-queer and non-binary 
people are consistently exposed to the sexual violence resulting from normative 
heterosexual cis-masculinity and its policing of others. The exclusion of 
transwomen from women’s spaces thus reintroduces essentialist notions of the 
location of sexual violence. Being a man, equated with being a sexual predator, 
becomes written into the body of transwomen who within these ideas become 
‘eternal men’, always trapped in the role of the male aggressor. This view not 
only erases the possibility of womanhood for anyone who was not ascribed 
girlhood at birth, it also reproduces a problematic understanding of sexual 
violence as inherent to male bodies. Rather than deconstructing and fighting 
sexual violence as a tool of power with multiple locations and manifestations, 
this naturalisation makes it immune to resistance. 
 
In order to fully grasp the political choices the group Get the L Out made in 
distributing the leaflet at London Pride, it is important to remind ourselves that 
this is a corporate-sponsored mainstream event. It consists of around 500 
groups, including representatives of the Royal Navy, the Metropolitan Police, the 
Army and in 2016, BAE, an arms manufacturer. What is striking is that in the face 
of this line-up of military, police and corporate forces, this lesbian group chooses 
to identify trans people as the ‘biggest threat’ to feminism. Not only does such a 
move favour a    transphobic history of lesbian feminism over an anti-war, anti- 
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police, anti-capitalist one, it also tells a story of lesbian feminism as not being 
able to address transnational forms of violence, including sexual violence 
through imperialist wars. While the group specifically targeted transwomen, 
they also call for an end to ‘the transing of lesbians who do not conform to 
femininity’.7 The irony in the last statement could not be more blatant. 
 
Lesbian feminists should know better than to single out women for not being 
proper women or ‘hiding the truth’ about their sex or gender. Have they 
forgotten about the many times they were assaulted for not being womanly 
enough or for overdoing femininity or for getting femininity wrong, for being 
seen as a sexual danger to straight, gender-conforming women, as the ‘lavender 
menace’ and a ‘mannish threat’ to feminism as Betty Friedan infamously put it? 
What are the imaginative limits to lesbian feminism that mean it seems 
impossible to draw a connection between their own lesbian gender- 
nonconforming bodies and sexualities and other forms of transing gender? Is 
transphobia a way to eagerly prove to be a proper woman for positionalities who 
have been excluded from womanhood for being lesbians, for representing non- 
normative genders and sexualities, for being feminists?8 In the end it is their own 
transphobia that makes them cis-gendered. What ever happened to Wittig’s 
lesbian, who is not a woman, and who these lesbian feminists appear to have 
forgotten? 
 
Inviting Wittig Back  
 
It is Wittig’s in/famous exclamation, ‘Lesbians are not women’ (Wittig [1978] 
1992, 32) that I want to revisit here. ‘Lesbians are not WOMEN’ opens up the 
 
7  https://www.mayday4women.com/2018/05/24/lets-get-the-l-out-of-here-sisters/ 
8 In a somewhat different interpretation transphobia could be seen as a haunting manifestation of lesbophobia 
within (some) lesbian contexts: a mode through which lesbophobia – the hatred against sexually and gender 
non-conforming women who are seen as failing the category and therefore are not allowed to inhabit the 
category – keeps haunting us. 
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possibility of reflecting on the category of women and its exclusions and 
inclusions. ‘LESBIANS are not women’ gives us the chance to look at the 
interconnection of lesbian thinking, lesbian identification, lesbian sexuality and 
lesbian theory in relation to the category of ‘women’; and ‘Lesbians ARE NOT 
women’ operates as a clear denial of belonging to the category of ‘women’ which 
moves us in the direction of questioning certainties about gender and its 
interconnection to sex and sexuality. As Ilana Eloit (2018, 26) underlines 
‘[r]adical lesbians were foundationally inspired by Monique Wittig’ and have 
understood Wittig’s theoretisations as interventions in the French Mouvement 
de Libération des Femmes (MLF) that was aggressively lesbophobic and 
obliterated its lesbian foundations. Moreover, as Eloit compellingly points out, 
Wittig’s thought enabled a shift of paradigms in French feminism: ‘From the 
standpoint of their new position as non-women, radical lesbians articulated an 
unprecedented public discourse on 1970s feminism’s exclusionary operations 
against lesbians, which they started calling “heterofeminism”.’ (Eloit 2018, 26; 
my emphasis). The erasure of lesbians in the MLF and with this the 
heterosexualisation of feminism is part of the ‘ghostly history’ Eloit tells (Eloit 
2018, 30) in an extensive archival work that exactly makes clear that radical 
lesbianism has a history of fighting against the exclusions, certainties and fixed 
identities of the category ‘woman’ and not the contrary. 
 
For Wittig, lesbians are not women because they do not fulfil the criteria of the 
category in economic, political or ideological dimensions (1992, 13). In other 
words, they refuse to do the labour that misogyny requires: working for men, 
pleasing men, raising children, being a respected wife and mother. Wittig’s 
utopia of a gender-free society has been much discussed: loved and hated by 
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lesbians,9 taken on in Butler’s Gender Trouble (2007 [1990]) and criticised and 
embraced by transgender studies scholars (e.g. Hale 1996; Henderson 2018; 
Tudor 2010). Wittig makes clear that regimes of heterosexuality – what other 
scholars have called ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ (Rich 1980) or the 
‘heterosexual matrix’ (Butler 2007, 7) – play a crucial role in defining, stabilising 
and reproducing gender. I agree with Butler’s warning against the ‘impossible 
fantasy’ of fully transcending power through refusal, an idea that lies in the 
concept of lesbians running away and leaving heterosexuality and, with this, 
gender behind (Butler 2007, 196). I argue, however, that we should not take 
Wittig too literally, but could take on the haunting that lies in this evocative 
exclamation: the haunting of contemporary lesbian transphobia in tension with 
the possibility of refusing gender. If it is possible to leave gender behind, who 
would stay on, who would want to stick with gender? 
 
As Clare Hemmings points out, Butler’s poststructuralist idea of gender is as 
much informed by Wittig’s lesbian feminist materialist rejection of what I call the 
‘labour of misogyny’ as it is by the approaches of other – gay male – 
poststructuralists like Foucault or by psychoanalysis. However, this lesbian 
strand is rarely as acknowledged in the feminist and queer reception of Butler 
(Hemmings 2011, 179-90). Indeed, Wittig’s crucial role in defining the normative 
(linguistic) violence of ‘the straight mind’ and its impact on the category ‘woman’ 
– which Butler uses centrally for troubling the automatised nexus of 
‘sex/gender/desire’ – can be understood as complicating strict oppositions 
between materialism and poststructuralism (see also Tudor 2010). Hemmings 
(2011, 181) asks ‘what happens when we invite Wittig back’ and questions the 
logics of linear feminist storytelling that seem to rely on the idea that something 
 
 
9  See Eloit’s (2018, 26) discussion of both positions. 
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needs to be left behind in order to progress (Hemmings 2011, 190). ‘Inviting 
Wittig back’ can be understood as engaging one of the lesbian ghosts that haunt 
queer feminism: foundational to its emergence, but neglected in common 
representations. This can be seen as a haunting that is productive in its lingering, 
precisely because it has always been there, even if unrecognised (see Eloit 2018). 
And for my purposes here, in my desire to read trans feminist and lesbian 
feminist histories together rather than holding them apart, it means that queer 
and trans feminist approaches can be re-read (Hemmings 2011, 180) from a 
perspective that centres lesbian feminist approaches to heteronormative labour 
and its refusal as paradigmatic for queering gender and sexuality. Wittig’s 
haunting opens up questions about the im/possible dimensions of refusing and 
choosing in relation to gender, and following her ghost means asking critical 
questions about the desire for gendered certainty and inclusion that lesbian 
feminist transphobia performs. 
 
It should have become clear by now, I am speaking from a position that has 
difficulties even distinguishing between a dyke/lesbian and trans identification. 
And while this is not true for all lesbian and trans people, the desire for gendered 
acceptance is something that ironically links some trans and some lesbian 
feminist arguments. Thus affinity, empathy, identification and solidarity (see 
Brah 1999, 13) for different ways of politicising non-normative embodiments, 
sexualities and representations rather than hostility could be a uniting project. 
In my view, embracing Wittig’s ghost has the capacity to take us beyond gender 
as a known and knowable entity and links this to complex analyses of power. But 
first we might need to ask what it is we reject, when we reject the ‘labour of 
misogyny’, and what is it we choose instead in doing so? 
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Decolonising Gender  
 
Feminist, queer and critical race approaches make clear that the concept of 
gender and with it womanhood is a colonial one. ‘Western sex/gender systems’, 
as Hazel Carby (2007, 123) puts it, are not only constructed in close interaction 
with racialisation but also exported through colonialism to the Global South. 
‘Heterosexism’, Maria Lugones (2007, 186) underlines, can be understood ‘as a 
key part of how gender fuses with race in the operations of colonial power’. 
Hortense Spillers carves out how slavery ‘ungenders’ both men and women, how 
it undoes whatever form of ‘gender’ had been relevant within the African 
societies the enslaved were taken from: ‘[t]hose African persons in “Middle 
Passage” were literally suspended in the “oceanic”’ (1987, 72). This means, as C. 
Riley Snorton (2017) so convincingly points out, that trans identity, the fungibility 
of gender, has a racial history (and a history of racism must also be one that 
interrogates gender). 
 
Bringing this back to the genealogy of Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (2007), one 
can read Snorton as intervening in the race-ignorant formulation of the 
sex/gender system (Rubin 1975). Through analysing psychoanalytical and 
Marxist approaches and structuralist anthropology, Gayle Rubin identifies a 
‘universal’ mode of regulating kinship with the help of culturalised heterosexual 
exchange systems. These turn the female sex into gender. Butler’s Gender 
Trouble not only deconstructs the subject of feminism and questions ‘woman’ as 
a pre-given category, but also shows (drawing on Wittig and Rubin) how sex has 
always been gender – how gender is not only a performative process attached 
‘on top of’ a sexed body but influences how the sexed body comes into existence 
and is seen to bear meaning. With this, Butler gives us an important extension 
of Rubin’s formulation of the ‘sex/gender system’. It engages with the 
poststructuralist  idea that normative  meaning making processes construct     a 
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certain structure as appearing to be pre-given (rather than assuming that it is the 
pre-given structure from which meaning can be deduced). Analysing 
gynecological experiments on enslaved women and escape narratives in 
modernist autobiographies, Snorton (2017, 53) explains that Black gender, 
ascribed to a ‘fleshed’ rather than sexed body, is fungible, bears the possibility 
of transing. Snorton’s approach, like Carby’s and Donna Haraway’s interventions 
in Rubin’s universalism, makes moreover clear that the sex/gender system must 
be understood as a ‘race/gender system’ (Haraway 2007) in which ‘racialized 
flesh’ and sex are interconnected in a complex and ‘bloody’ relationship (Snorton 
2017). Of course, sex and race are not interchangeable, nor do they have the 
same relation to gender. Butler’s theory makes it possible to interrupt the 
normative nexus of ‘sex/gender/desire’ by pointing out the internal ruptures of 
this naturalised fugue. Going beyond this, Snorton (2017, 17) speaks of 
‘ungendered flesh’ as opposed to ‘sex’: the racialised body that is disposable and 
violently chopped into pieces which brings ‘female sex’ into existence as a white 
concept, as the untouchable body of white femininity. 
 
In Wittig’s approach there is only sex and there is no sex at the same time. For 
Wittig sex is solely a category of the ‘straight mind’, an invention for the purpose 
of stabilising the economic, political and ideological order of heterosexuality: ‘It 
is oppression that creates sex and not the contrary’ (Wittig 1992, 2). This notion 
of ‘sex’, and with it the category ‘women’ as constructed through violence and 
oppression, is what I am interested here. Butler points out that Wittig’s approach 
leads them to define sex as an object which ‘has been violently shaped’, and in 
which ‘the history and mechanism of that violent shaping no longer appears’ 
(2007, 155). In a footnote Butler remarks that this shaping could also be 
understood in terms of sexual violence (Butler 2007, 225). I think, however, that 
it  is  important  to  note  that  Wittig’s  approach  is  not  restricted  to  or  even 
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particularly interested in sexual violence, but that Wittig understands the 
violence of shaping sex as a violence that lies in the consistent reproduction of 
dominant (gender) categories. This violence is realised through language and is 
both effect and result of the constant reproduction of heteronormative 
categories that takes place on many levels of social heterosexual interaction 
(Wittig 1992, 29). Bearing this in mind, I argue again that it is important to 
differentiate between understandings of violence – an insight that is important 
for intervening in transphobic lesbian feminist debates that oversimplify the 
connection of sex and sexual violence. First, and privileged here, understandings 
that define categorial violence (the violence, including sexual violence, that 
comes with essentialist categories) as working discursively and having a complex 
and contradictory relationship with the emergence of gender.10 And second, 
examined critically in my intervention, understandings that define sexual 
violence as having an automatic relation to the emergence and definition of 
gender (or sex, as many sexual violence based approaches argue against a focus 
on gender). In her insightful 1999 preface to Gender Trouble, Butler centralises 
the violence that cannot be reduced to sexual violence by pointing to ‘the ways 
in which the very thinking of what is possible in gendered life is foreclosed by 
certain habitual and violent presumptions’ (2007, viii; my emphasis). This 
‘normative violence’, as Butler calls it (2007, xxi), needs to be countered with a 
political movement towards legitimising ‘bodies that have been regarded as 
false, unreal, and unintelligible’ (2007, xxv). Butler speaks here of ‘queer bodies’ 
– bodies that do not fulfil dominant sexed and gendered norms: butches, 
femmes, trans people, faggots etc. For Butler then to counter violence, including 
sexual violence, the scripts of gendered and sexual normativity need to be 
interrupted and common cause made between and with those subjects who 
 
 
10 On Wittig’s understanding of discursive/linguistic violence see also Tudor 2010, Karhu 2016. 
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cannot easily be included in ‘man’ or ‘woman’ as fixed categories. What happens 
to this thought if racialisation is not seen as the mere add-on to gender and 
‘queer bodies’ but as central to the emergence of them? The endeavor to 
counter normative gender violence (and within this sexual violence) certainly 
requires to acknowledge that both have been tools of white supremacy for 
centuries. 
 
Bringing this thought back to my initial discussion of Wittig’s lesbian, it turns out 
that it may not be so straightforward after all to revive them for queer feminist 
and transgender theorisations: Wittig’s lesbian is an inherently white subject. 
Indeed, the most blatant weakness of Wittig’s theory is the constant reference 
to lesbians as ‘fugitive slaves’ (1992, 20). In Wittig’s conceptualisation, being a 
lesbian means rejecting the oppression that makes them into a woman. Wittig 
equates this with escaping slavery. Of course, as it is the case with most 
analogies, this one does not allow for thinking interdependencies. With the 
failure to think slavery in its own right, Wittig’s idea of the oppressiveness of sex 
and of refusing to be a woman can only conceptualise a white lesbian subject. At 
this point, my reading differs from Kevin Henderson’s who suggests that ‘Wittig’s 
materialist conception of language opens up space for thinking about how the 
compulsory category of sex also incites the racialization of bodies’ (2018, 196). 
Wittig’s analogy of the lesbian as the ‘runaway slave’ (in varying formulations 
across her work: 1992, 6, 8, 20, 30 etc.), in my view rather closes down the 
possibility of a nuanced analysis of the interdependencies of sex, gender and 
racialisation.11 Yet, how can one think of the relationship of slavery with refusing 
 
 
11 I am not alone with this analysis. Claire Blencowe (2011) for example speaks of ‘curious absences’ in Wittig’s 
anti-biologist approach when it comes to questions of racism and supremacism. My article does not aim to give 
a full account of Wittig’s writings, as it revisits mainly the potentials and – inseparably connected with this – the 
failures of the ‘lesbians-are-not-women’ thought. For a broader discussion of Wittig’s work see Eloit (2018), and 
with particular focus on Wittig’s concept of normative (linguistic) violence, see Tudor 2010. 
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to do what heterosexuality requires in ways that are not reduced to an analogy? 
But rather in ways that recognise both the forming moment of a colonial past 
and the ongoing ‘traumatic reality’ of slavery, as Grada Kilomba (2008, 13) puts 
it? Again, having colonialism’s shaping past and presence and racist regimes of 
power in mind, what would it mean to refuse to be a woman in a way that takes 
account of who is already included and excluded from that category? 
 
While it is necessary to acknowledge slavery and the Middle Passage for 
contemporary understandings of the Black diaspora and the modern world order 
(Gilroy 1993), critical voices have warned against a collapsing of Blackness with 
(post)slavery (e.g. Thomas/Campt 2002, 2; Wright 2015). Michelle Wright points 
out that the Middle Passage Epistemology operates within ‘linear spacetime’ 
(2015, 60), forcing not only Black women and queers to identify with a Black male 
modernity, but excluding Black diasporic subjects whose histories cannot (fully) 
be understood through the transatlantic slave trade (2015, 27). What is 
important to take forward for the argument I am attempting to make here, 
however, is Gilroy’s work in the Black Atlantic (1993) on the entanglement of 
modernity with slavery. Europe has funded its industrialisation with the 
transatlantic slave trade (Gilroy 1993, 64) and capitalism and all terms related to 
understandings of labour within capitalism cannot be thought without it (Gilroy 
1993, 62). Thinking the refusal of gendered labour without these histories, 
indeed, strips the very idea what ‘labour’ is under capitalism (as well as what and 
who one is refusing) from its most important foundations. 
 
What to do then with Wittig’s lesbian who offers a re-thinking of refusal and 
choice, but who is stuck in a white feminist ignorance when the labour they 
consider necessary for ‘womanhood’ does not include deconstructing 
racialisation  and  acknowledging  colonialism’s  shaping  presence?  It becomes 
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clear that if one tries to escape the ties of gendered heterosexuality without 
acknowledging racism’s foundational role in the construction of gender, the 
haunting that remains will certainly be a nightmarish one. My question is 
therefore not so much if Wittig’s lesbian can be saved as a transgressive hero or 
if they should be doomed as problematic to the core, but rather if there is 
anything that can be learned from both these readings of the figure? Can we 
reclaim Wittig’s lesbian as a figure who refuses both the heteronormative and 
the racialised labour that produce ‘womanhood’ and its exclusions, as entangled 
rather than analogous political projects? 
 
 
The Political Power of Refusing and Choosing Gender 
 
Love Relationships  
 
Let me begin this last part with myself. I was a lesbian once (no surprises here). 
And the haunting of the genderqueer migrant kid, who was not a boy, but wasn’t 
a proper girl either, and called themself ‘lesbian’ in their teenage years, still 
leaves indelible tracks in my knowledge production. Growing up in a 
conservative and provincial small town in Southern Germany, I cannot say if it 
was being a migrant or being queer what made me so deeply confused about 
the rules of heterosexuality and gender. I simply could not understand the 
language – or maybe I should say the Southern German dialect – of normative 
gender and sexuality. I came of age identifying with the only political term 
available to me: lesbian feminist. One of the most obvious connections between 
lesbian-queer-trans-nonbinary-feminist is the fact that a lot of us have 
transitioned through these categories of self-identification, politicisation and 
community – not necessarily in this order, not necessarily separated from each 
other and not necessarily passing each category only once. In a similar vein, both 
Cameron Awkward-Rich and Jay Barnard  formulate the relationship    between 
Dr Alyosxa Tudor | at53@soas.ac.uk 
16 
 
 
 
 
trans and (radical) feminism in terms of love. Barnard, a programmer of the BFI 
Flare London LGBTQ+ Film Festival, with the event Radfem/Trans: A Love Story 
(March 26th, 2018) carves out on screen traces of feminist controversies ‘around 
race, sex work, porn and trans inclusion’.12 Awkward-Rich foregrounds the role 
rejection plays as part of many love stories: ‘Love, that is, does not necessarily 
name a happy relation’ (2017, 383). 
 
Aware of this love relationship that is shaped by potential unhappiness and 
rejection, I have delineated my knowledge production very clearly from a 
collapsing of gender with oppression in strands of lesbian feminism that 
overdetermine the role of sexual violence for the emergence of gender. But of 
course, each of these terms – ‘lesbian’, ‘sexual violence’, ‘feminism’ are 
undeniably part of my history of politicisation. My analysis attempts to criticise 
the shortcuts ‘sexual violence feminism’ takes to make sense of oppression’s role 
in the emergence of gendering. In particular, it is my goal to address the 
simplification of a causal approach to gender and sexual violence that leads to 
single-issue-politics, racism, transphobia and misogyny. Like Awkward-Rich and 
Barnard, who speak of love, my engagement is certainly affective. However, it 
turns out I am not prepared to cede the terrain of ‘lesbian’ to sexual violence 
feminists either. Moving on from my analysis of sexual violence feminism to 
carve out the lesbian feminist work of transing gender, I am not intending to 
revive lesbian feminism in its exclusionary forms or simply lament its passing as 
a location I could (however un/comfortably) inhabit, but rather to deal with the 
possibility that the lesbian feminism that had a forming role in my politicisation 
will keep haunting me if I do not engage with its genealogies. After all, the 
connection between lesbian and trans and the resulting negotiation of gender is 
 
 
12  https://www.facebook.com/events/929055587273356 [16/12/2018] 
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based on ‘refusing to make sense’ in gendered terms, as Bobby Noble (2007) 
puts it. 
 
In a critical commentary on her introduction to the anthology The Lesbian 
Postmodern (Doan 1994), Robyn Wiegman (2011, 203) makes clear that her 
contribution back in 1994 was an attempt to ‘[abandon] the “lesbian” as the 
figure of our critical and political destination altogether’. However, in retrospect 
Wiegman discusses the impossibilities of complete detachment and underlines 
that ‘we are always bound to that we try to refuse’ (2011, 203). Awkward-Rich 
makes a similar point looking at transmasculine connections between feminism 
and trans. He reminds us that feminist and trans re-writings of the boy ‘often 
rely on the deferral of the girl’ (Awkward-Rich 2017, 836), which however, as he 
stresses, does not make the girl disappear. 
 
This epistemological claim that we are ‘always bound to what we try to refuse’ 
must mean something too for the possibility to refuse gender. Butler underlines 
that becoming a subject is always already a process that relies on gendering and 
warns against a simplistic idea of deconstruction: ‘Such a willful and instrumental 
subject, one who decides on its gender, is clearly not its gender from the start 
and fails to realize that its existence is already decided by gender’ (1993, x; 
emphasis Butler). However we put it, it is evident: transing gender, gender- 
nonbinary positions and refusing and choosing in relation to gender do not make 
gender disappear; instead they underline their gendered genealogies. One could 
read my engagement with lesbian feminism here therefore as an attempt to 
engage with the haunting of both the girl and the lesbian, by not letting myself 
reject ‘her’, but by re-telling the story of the lesbian in a way that requires   the 
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pronoun ‘they’13, the lesbian I can live with, who is not a woman and who knows 
not only about sexual violence and about the violence of rigid gender roles, but 
also about desire. And whose politics make the very possibility of feminist single- 
issue-struggles impossible. 
 
 
Refusing the Labour of Misogyny   
 
I have always loved the exclamation ‘lesbians are not women’ because it allowed 
me to embrace my non-binary body and self – not being allowed to be a woman 
due to being gender-nonconforming, not wanting to be a woman as a 
revolutionary process based on a desire for a gender-free utopia; embracing my 
ambiguous gendering as a gendered way of being in the world that I desire for 
myself and through which I desire others. However, what is important about 
Wittig’s exclamation is that it is not about gender representation. Even if I 
embrace the exclamation from a non-binary/trans position that is relatively 
straightforward to read as ‘not-woman’14, Wittig’s proposition does not only 
apply to butch dykes, intersex or non-binary dykes or trans masculine people (all 
of these identifications can be but are not necessarily connected)! High femmes 
and tomboy femmes or androgynous femininities – transwomen or not – are 
within my reading of her definition of ‘lesbian’ too. It is about refusing to do the 
labour  of  heteronormativity/sexism/misogyny,  remember,  not  (or  not only) 
 
 
 
13 Interestingly, Wittig suggests ‘they’ as English translation for the French ‘elles’ pronoun in Les Guérillères, but 
also explains how the two produce not the same meaning (Wittig 1992, 87). With this, Wittig gives ‘they’ as 
transing pronoun a lesbian feminist history. But again, in the same section Wittig engages in violent analogies by 
equating the word ‘women’ with the N-word and with this provides another example of their absolute refusal to 
address racialisation/racism in its own terms (ibid., 86). Thank you to Ilana Eloit for reminding me of the 
paragraph. 
14 As I have pointed out elsewhere (Tudor 2017b), I consider all gendered readings as misreadings and entangled 
power relations complicate the possibility of reading gender straightforwardly. For example in my case, being 
read as a migrant has an impact on how people read my gender which indeed then never can be normative, but 
will always be read as non-belonging. Despite of being read as migratised, however, white privilege in my case 
means that people are more pre-occupied with my ambiguous gendering than with placing me within their 
phantasies of proper geographical/national belonging. 
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about appearance or gender representation! This means of course that for 
lesbian transwomen whose political and subjective struggles entail fighting to be 
recognised as women, ‘lesbians are not women’ can mean exactly to reclaim the 
term ‘women’ as one possible way of refusing the labour of misogyny. Dealing 
with misogyny, with the hatred against women and femininity, also means 
addressing the many forms it can take: the hatred against transwomen or non- 
binary people who are seen as eternal men; the hatred against femmes who are 
either seen as overdoing markers of femininity or not getting them right; the 
hatred of non-binary people, butch dykes or trans masculine people who are 
seen as ‘mannish’ ‘ugly’ women and therefore not available for the male gaze 
and heterosexual economies. In short, for some people, for some bodies, 
choosing femininity or choosing to be a woman is liberating, for some being 
forced into it is a curse, so rejection and choice and their complex negotiations 
can both become strategies of resistance. 
 
In order to question simplistic ideas of femininity and masculinity that reduce 
gender to appearance and seem to be sure how ‘seeing’ and ‘reading’ gender 
works (Tudor 2017b), we need to dissect dimensions of not/womanhood and 
their connection to power relations like racism, migratism15, classism, ableism, 
queer/trans and dykephobia and misogyny. In ‘Whose feminism is it anyway?’, 
Emi Koyama (2006) points out that anti-trans feminism shares a genealogy with 
white feminism’s single-issue-politics. Looking at feminism and its relation to the 
category of ‘women’, we can think of many examples in the history of so called 
‘women’s’ rights, which were limited to white/Western women only. Refusing 
to be a woman, then, must include dealing with the racial politics that lie in the 
 
 
15 Migratism is the power relation that ascribes migration to certain bodies and creates with this hierarchical 
positions of belonging to the nation. This process of migratisation works interdependently with racialisation, but 
is not the same (Tudor 2014, 2017a, 2018). 
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category and the politics of racialisation that create the category. This means too 
that refusing to be a woman as a political act needs at times to be able to think 
being a woman as a privilege, for you first have to be recognised as a woman in 
order to be able to refuse the category. This thought makes clear that Black 
women and women of color, transwomen, butch dykes, gender-nonconforming, 
disabled and intersex persons etc. might be so fundamentally excluded from the 
category that being able to refuse its labour becomes the unreachable 
privilege.16 Awkward-Rich (2017, 836) speaks of the ‘the added risk of both being 
seen as women and as failing to be so’. However, the problem of linear 
conceptualisation becomes evident in my formulation of this list of excluded 
positionalities. And indeed, positionality is important here. Through the various 
theoretisations it becomes clear that as a Black person, refusing racialised labour 
is refusing processes of being ‘un-gendered’, whereas as a white person refusing 
heteronormative labour is refusing being ‘gendered’. How to think complex 
abjectifications within this thought? If Black women, for example, are already 
excluded from the category ‘woman’ (‘ungendered’ in Spillers’ term), how can 
we make sure that within this theoretical claim, Black intersex, non-binary and 
trans people are not rendered abject – the impossible positions in an 
understanding of racialised gendering as always already excluded from 
normative (white) gendering? Moreover, racialisation has not only come into 
existence through slavery, but through many entangled, continued and 
discontinued regimes of colonialism, displacement and oppression. How can we 
analyse the ways in which racialisations that are not (or not only) connected to 
slavery contribute to a complex gendering and ungendering?17 
 
 
16 Even if the linearity of language means that these positionalities appear here as a list, I understand them as 
overlapping and interdependent. 
17 As examples of reading multiple racisms together, see Day’s (2015) investigation of Anti-Blackness in relation 
to critiques of settler colonialism, and Vimalassery, Pegues, Goldstein’s (2016) endeavour of ‘analyzing 
epistemologies of unknowing by engaging critical indigenous thought, critical race theory, postcolonial feminist 
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Through these questions and through the genealogies I am relying on here, it 
should become clear that it is not my intention to replace feminist approaches 
that collapse the emergence of gender and sexual violence with approaches that 
see the im/possibilities of subject- and personhood as solely shaped by race. 
While critiques that see ‘Afro-Pessimism’ as privileging the violence of 
racialisation over other forms of violence could be understood as making a 
similar claim to my critique of ‘sexual violence feminism’, I think the equation is 
misleading. The critical race approaches cited here, that cannot be subsumed 
under one term and many of which I do not read as Afro-pessimist, offer much 
more nuanced analyses of the nexus of racialisation/gender/sexuality than the 
simple collapsing of gender and sexual violence I charge ‘sexual violence 
feminism’ with. The most important difference is that they conceptualise 
racialisation interdependently with gender and sexuality, while approaches that 
single out sexual violence often are monolithic. Moreover, the underlying 
concept of what ‘violence’ is differs fundamentally. Even if Saidiya Hartman who 
I refer to below for example is included in the body of work labelled as ‘Afro- 
Pessimism’, her insistence that ‘race’ is ‘both a death sentence and the language 
of solidarity’ (2008, 6) already opens up possibilities of thinking Blackness as not 
overdetermined by violence.18 Gail Lewis (2017, 8) points out that ‘structurally 
and ideologically legitimated [racist] violence; renders the ‘“black woman” an 
oxymoron if not an impossibility’. With this, Lewis theorises the emergence of 
gender and its connection to violence in contrast to an understanding that sees 
‘women’ only as the product of sexual violence. Indeed, she offers a very 
nuanced epistemological concept of violence that is focused on  deconstructing 
 
theory, critical disability studies, queer theory, and women of color feminism in order to trouble theorizations of 
settler colonialism as a stand-alone analytic’. 
18 For a historicisation of Afro-Pessimism through Black feminist and queer theory and therefore as 
antimasculinist, see Sexton 2016. 
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the work of the normative: ‘[T]he capacity to generate new meaning is a function 
of the dynamic tension between presence and absence [of the Black woman]’, 
underlines Lewis (2017, 15), and it is this ‘capacity to generate new meaning’, in 
Lewis’s words, that is important to my discussion of choosing and refusing 
gender here. 
 
Nael Bhanji (2012, 170) reminds us that trans people of color ‘occupy the 
inhospitable territories in between… the uninhabitable “geographies of 
ambiguity”’. Coming from a migrant perspective, I do not shy away from 
metaphors of migration and displacement in conceptualising gender (see Tudor 
2017b). How to make sense, then, and politically acknowledge the 
uninhabitability of gender-nonbinary – of not being able to be read and make 
oneself readable in terms that are either male or female, masculine or feminine, 
migrant or ‘at-home’? Politically, we must be able to distinguish between 
gender-nonbinary which makes bodies unintelligible in gendered terms that can 
effect Black, brown, non-white and white persons; the claiming of gender- 
nonbinary as an ideological strategy that does not coincide with a vulnerability 
(as it is seen increasingly in the generic use of the pronoun ‘they’); and what 
Spillers calls ‘ungendering’ of Black people through slavery. This means that 
Spillers’ conceptualisation of ‘ungendering’, the rejection of binary gender out 
of political conviction, and inhabiting the world as a trans person in a way that 
does not allow for a stable gendered reading, are not the same as all three 
phenomena do not generate vulnerability in the same way. Nor is their 
relationship of exclusion within ‘womanhood’ or ‘gender’ identical and the 
labour they need to refuse to effect exit the same. However, of course it is 
important to think ‘ungendering’, transing gender and gender-nonbinary in 
complex interdependencies. Diaspora studies scholars like Wright (2004) and 
Thomas/Campt (2006) make clear that the attempts of Black male  intellectuals 
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to re-introduce Black masculinity into the history of modernity has also made 
sure that heterosexuality and binary gendering were reclaimed within that 
normative endeavour. As Snorton (2017) and Bhanji (2012) point out, 
racialisation means for trans and non-binary people of color in the diaspora 
being constructed in multiple ways as ambivalent/non-belonging towards the 
dominant norm of Whiteness and gender in Western nation states. Trans 
feminism and Black feminism, as Kai M. Green and Marquis Bey put it, ‘both 
name, in different ways and by different inflections […] a major problem with 
the category ‘woman’’ (2017, 438-9). Their overlap is, as Green and Bey 
compellingly make clear, about deconstructing and politicising ‘an excess of 
categorization’ (2017, 452). 
 
 
Gender Hurts?  
 
All these interventions show that ‘gender hurts’, to appropriate and re-signify 
Jeffreys’ book title here, and many non-binary, trans, feminist and queer 
approaches actually deconstruct this pain and violence that comes with rigid 
gender regimes and racism. But what do we make of the desire for gender, for 
‘[T]ransitive gender. Queer gender. Gender-everywhere-on-the-move’ 
(Wiegman 2006, 90), the queer feminist pleasure that lies in performing one’s 
own gender and desiring others as gendered beings? Wiegman’s approach to 
gender is, like Butler’s, not only focused on the normative violence of gendering 
but also on the pleasure that can lie in performing one’s own gender and in 
desiring gender in others. This means understanding sexuality in terms that do 
not reduce it to sexual violence and gender in terms that go beyond simply 
seeing it in a causal relationship with oppression, while ‘pleasure’ and ‘desire’ in 
these accounts are not considered to be outside of the normative. For many 
feminists,  the  fight  against sexual  violence is  the point of departure  for their 
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politicisation and solidarity, and yet a lot of us choose activisms and forms of 
knowledge production that have the ability to theorise, define and value the role 
pleasure plays for both gender and sexuality. Given the widespread exposure of 
queer, dyke, trans and non-binary people to sexual violence in institutions like 
families, schools, prisons etc., one certainly cannot assume that it is only sexual 
violence feminists who have reason to deal with the topic or that all politicisation 
that follows sexual violence results in approaches that deny desire and 
essentialise sexual difference. 
 
Ann Cvetkovich provocatively considers whether ‘incest makes you queer’ and 
with this asks what work it could do for queer feminist resistance to ‘embrace 
rather than refuse the links between lesbian sexual practices and sexual 
abuse/incest’? (1995, 358).19 Cvetkovich underlines that it is highly problematic 
to speculate on the causes of queerness, but on the other hand sees it as a 
‘missed opportunity’ (1995, 357) not to theorise the interconnections of sexual 
abuse and queerness. She points out that ‘there’s something right, rather than 
something wrong’ with being queer. Therefore, as she points out, a child turned 
queer could be re-theorised as ‘welcome effects of sexual abuse’ (1995, 357). Of 
course, Cvetkovich neither advocates for sexual abuse nor sees it as the cause of 
queerness, but theorises subjectivity and trauma in ways that do not assume 
having been harmed as the essence of the subject. It is the conceptualisation of 
lesbianism as the choice of queerness in the face of heterosexual abuse that is 
important about her intervention – if heterosexuality has already shown its ugly 
side and the romance of heterosexuality is stripped of its masks, why bother with 
 
19 The piece in which Cvetkovich (1995) poses these questions is highly interesting due to the fact that she 
discusses the sex-positive art of Tribe8, a dyke punk band that frequently performed at the Michigan Womyn’s 
Music Festival, an event that was known for its notorious exclusion of transwomen (see Koyama 2006). However, 
as seen in Tribe8’s lead singer Lynn Breedlove’s ongoing engagement in gender-nonconforming and trans politics, 
strategies of trans-exclusion do not prevent a transing from happening. In this case developed out of sex-positive 
dyke punk politics. 
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looking for the other, less violent faces of it? She concludes: ‘Perhaps we can live 
with the queer interdependence of that which harms and that which heals in 
order to embrace the unpredictable potential of traumatic experience’ 
(Cvetkovich 1995, 357). 
 
I want to suggest that Cvetkovich opens up a complex argument on refusing and 
choosing gender and sexuality and on thinking violence and desire, oppression 
and resistance interdependently. It becomes clear: We are more than the sum 
of our harms and we are always already complicit in gender. Nat Raha (2017, 
632) theorises a similar thought and compellingly shows how transfeminine 
desire can lead to a politicisation of ‘brokenness’. Saidiya Hartman focuses on 
these interdependencies in relation to the emergence of race when she 
explicates how for the Europeans ‘race was invented as a hierarchy of human 
life’ (2008, 6), while for those who were turned into slaves, ‘race was both a 
death sentence and the language of solidarity’ (2008, 6). Another angle to this 
entanglement is opened up in Omise’eke Natasha Tinsley’s (2008) important 
intervention in both queer studies and black studies. Tinsley conceptualises 
‘queering’ as refusing to cease to exist in the context of the Middle Passage. 
Women’s love relationships on the sex-segregated decks are a ‘“choice” of black 
queerness’ (Tinsley 2008, 193) – a resistance to white terror, slavery and 
genocide. While Spillers (1987, 72) speaks of the erasure of gender in the 
oceanic, Tinsley’s ‘choice of queerness’ is the antidote to ‘ungendering’: ‘fluid 
black bodies refused to accept that the liquidation of their social selves […] 
meant the liquidation of their sentient selves’ (Tinsley 2008, 199). 
 
Such complex theorisations underscore my earlier argument on Wittig’s use of 
slavery as an analogy that does not get us very far in defining the political power 
of refusing and choosing gender. If there is something that can be salvaged then 
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from invoking Wittig’s utopia of a gender-free society, it is an epistemological 
claim. I would suggest, relying on Hemmings’ theorisation of ‘feminist political 
ambivalence’ (2018) and Jose Muñoz’ (1999) concept of ‘disidentification’ that 
we accept that there is no such a thing as purity in knowledge production. 
Hemmings’ thoughts on feminist political ambivalence help us to not try to ‘clean 
up’ (2018, 36) any epistemological mess, but to work productively with the 
contradictions that at times can feel unbearable. As Muñoz (1999, 5) makes 
clear, disidentification – the ‘identification-despite’ and the simultaneous refusal 
to identify – is a survival strategy for ‘minority subjects’, who cannot afford the 
luxury of easy and pure identification due to multiple and interdependent 
oppressions. Furthermore, I am completely aware of the fact that I call on 
scholars like Lewis and Wiegman amongst others to help me make the argument 
against a lesbian feminism that is engaged in single-issue-politics. Is this not 
beating ‘lesbian feminism’ at its own game, introducing anti-racist and queer 
feminist approaches on gender and sexuality that have previously engaged 
lesbian feminism in their knowledge productions in order to exactly deconstruct 
simplistic ideas of violence, oppression and resistance (Lewis 2005; Wiegman 
1994, 2011)? 
 
This is not to make Wiegman and Lewis into lesbian feminists, at least not more 
than I make myself into one. It is rather to build politics on the ‘unknowable’ (see 
Brah 1999) and the uncertainty of our own transgressive potential. Therefore, I 
suggest to consider the lesbian haunting to be constitutive for trans feminism, 
to be a transing of gender that might have been forgotten or denied, but that 
nevertheless does its work for feminism and queer and trans knowledge 
production. Acknowledging the ambivalence of all haunting, I argue that the 
nightmares can also be productive and force us to confront and politicise the fact 
of having gotten it wrong in the past (and continuing to do so in the present). 
Dr Alyosxa Tudor | at53@soas.ac.uk 
27 
 
 
 
 
What if we have to accept the ‘queer interdependence of that which harms and 
that which heals’ (Cvetkovich 1995, 373) in our politics and knowledge 
production? Is this how to turn oppression into resistance: to politicise the 
inescapabilties of the ambivalences of pleasure and harm, of desire and violence 
and of autonomy and complicity? 
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